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Entries in national security politics (3)

Monday
Dec152008

Korean penninsula and India/Pak comparison

Last week I heard a talk by Ambassador Jhe Seong-Ho, South Korea's ambassador at-large for human rights.  He took care to outline the philosophy underpinning the new administration's stances toward North Korea. Basically, it was a total rejection of past South Korean policy and of liberal-internationalist theories of International Relations: for example, the idea that economic exchange can lead to peace, or that participation in multilateral institutions might alter the behavior of rogue states.

These are the sorts of actions that Ambassador Jhe characterized as "appeasement" toward the North.  He said that South Korean president Lee Myung-bak's administration--they've been in power for almost a year--has a very different approach to relations with North Korea then the last couple of governments in Seoul.  They're skeptical of sunshine policies and generally take a more hard-line approach to relations with the North.  Ambassador Jhe used strong language to characterize prior approaches... he said that his predecessors were "begging for talks" and took on a "subservient posture."

The new policy of the South Korean government is "cool and detached."  No more exchange unless the North offers true reciprocity, and no more "romantic" multilateral efforts unless the bilateral relationships are on a strong footing.

This issue of engagement vs. non-engagement is always in play between India and Pakistan.  In the last couple of decades different administrations and leaders have taken different approaches.  And really, the policies have not been so consistent by administration...the same leaders advocate conciliatory or hard-line views depending on the political moment.   A stark example is early 1999, when Nawaz Sharif and Vajpayee met and signed the Lahore accords and there was hope of better relations, but just a few months later the two countries were almost at war and even low-level meetings of officials were unlikely.  The rhetoric that justified these actions also see-saws.  Depending on the political climate, sometimes India says it will not engage with Pakistan unless Pakistan makes a concession first, like clamping down on terrorism in Kashmir.  At other times, like in early 1999, high level leaders meet in order to hammer out compromises.

But in both South Asia and the Korean penninsula, despite these various approaches, the same basic tense situation persists.  Part of it must be that the two sides in either conflict have such diametrically opposed goals on a couple of key issues (unification of the Korean penninsula, Kashmir) that it seems like the strategies of administrations, engagement or non-engagement, are unlikely to accomplish much.  Such tactics only matter in an environment where some amount of cooperation is possible.  But when there's no room for give or take on a particular issue, does it matter which theoretical school of thought you're coming from?

 

 

 

Wednesday
Dec032008

pakistani involvement in the mumbai attacks

Its hard to separate hysteria from fact if you're trying to read about who is responsible for the mass murder in Mumbai.  I've been following Indian online newspapers closely over the past several days. I've found palpable hostility toward Pakistan (understandably, perhaps?) as well as very biased coverage.

Yesterday, the main headline on the Times of India website was about a Pakistani television host who declared that the Mumbai attacks were led by "Hindu Zionists."  The story made you think that such opinons are common in Pakistan.  I admit that I don't have any idea what's being said on Pakistani television lately, but I have been reading the coverage of mainstream newspapers-- and the opinions of that one television host just don't reflect what I've seen. My sense is that Pakistanis are alternating between deep sympathy for Mumbaikars and agitation because they perceive that the United States and India have been too quick to implicate Pakistan.

So as news continues to break about the source of the attacks, how should we evaluate Pakistan's level of involvement ?

Here are some issues that I think are important to consider:

  • The attacks were launched from Pakistani territory. The attackers came from Karachi and arrived in Mumbai over water.
  • The nationality of individual militants is a peripheral issue. What matters more is who sponsored them. Some of the September 11 hijackers were Egyptian, but this turned out to be fairly irrelevant in assigning responsibility to Al-Qaeda. Nevertheless, there is one known surviving militant from the attacks. Rumor is that he is Pakistani. He does look South Asian, at least, and his name seems Pakistani enough... but Pakistani Prime Minister Asif Ali Zardari said on Larry King Live that there is no proof that the guy is Pakistani. (He did not sound believable, in case you are wondering...).
  • Some U.S. intelligence officials have said that the Pakistan-based terrorist organization Lashkar-e-Taiba may be responsible for the attacks. However, Condoleezza Rice said yesterday that it was premature to attach repsonsibility for the attacks on any one organization. She also urged Pakistan to be cooperative and transparent in investigations. Uncharacteristially, LeT has not accepted responsibility yet.
  • Pakistan's intelligence agency, the ISI, has supported Islamic militant groups in the past, including Lashkar-e-Taiba. In the 1990's, material state support for these groups was part of the government's strategy to end Indian control in Kashmir. (This is documented in interviews of militants and ISI officials themselves). In 2001, LeT sponsored the attack on the Indian Parliament. However, LeT has been a banned terrorist organization since 2002 and the Pakistani government under Musharraf ended state support for militant organizations, under strong pressure from the United States. In 2007 and 2008, there were a series of NYT articles and interviews (like this one) reporting that these organizations were still active, and the Pakistani government had, to a large extent, lost control of their activities.
  • The Pakistani government is very fragmented, with deep disagreement among agencies and leaders about the nature of relations with India. Soon after the attacks, Prime Minister Gilani offered to send the head of Pakistan's intelligence services to India, but the offer was rescinded. This likely means that Gilani's government doesn't have full control over the intelligence services, and there are intelligence and army officials who, for whatever reasons, do not want to cooperate with India. Also, the different wings of the ISI have simultaneously fought against and supported Islamic militant organizations within Pakistan.
  • In the case of Pakistan, the line between the state and non-state actors can be fuzzy. Zardari said on Larry King that non-state actors are responsible for the Mumbai attacks. We don't know yet if that is true or not, but it can't be denied that the fragmented nature of the Pakistani government and the differing opinions on patronage to militant organizations really blurs the line between state and non-state actors.

So given all this, I wil speculate that the civilian, elected Pakistani government probably was not involved with the attacks, but it is possible that parts of the army or ISI were. For the people of Pakistan, these attacks are a terrible development. Increased tensions with India are very risky; besides provoking conflict with a much stronger military power, they divert funds from domestic spending on things like infrastructure and education and they lower Pakistan's international standing significantly. The only part of Pakistan that has an existential need to continue conflict with India is the army. If India is not a major, active threat, what is the purpose of an overly large conventional army?

Finally, I don't think the Pakistani electorate--the people--should be held responsible for the actions and machinations of the army. In the United States, the military has strong civilian oversight and coordination with the elected government... and while it is mobilized by this government, we have all seen that even its actions are sometimes out of sync with public opinion and the judgement of the State Department and elected officials. In Pakistan, the army does not reflect the state as a whole or the desires of the people in this way, but it is by far the most powerful political player.

I think these lines of reasoning are logical, but I do know that I am just speculating. With all the conflicting reports around, and with access to only soundbites and leaks from government officials, all anyone can do, so far, is guess.

Thursday
Jun192008

national security issues leaking into ration card administration

I'm really interested in how national security issues are related to citizenship rights.  But as far as my fieldwork goes, I've taken care not to research the topic directly because its sensitive and the Indian government prefers that researchers do not broach it.  Every once in a while though, the topic comes up, unsolicitied, in my conversations and interviews about ration cards.

Rations aren't technically a right of citizenship, because by law, you don't have to be Indian to get a ration card.  But in practice, one of the concerns that rationing officers and government officials are rumored to have is that Bangladeshis are applying for and getting ration cards, and using them as an inroad to establishing an Indian identity and possibily providing an avenue for extremist groups to embed themselves in Indian society.  Or, to put it more directly, that terrorists are getting ration cards.  This is hearsay, because no government official has actually said this to me.  NGO workers say that it is often the stated basis on which applications for ration cards are denied, even if the real reason for the denial may be that the officer is angling for a bribe.

As Ms. Joshi (the director of Apnalaya, an NGO that works with these issues) says, it is an obstructionist tactic for rationing officers to put the burden of proof of citizenship on the applicant.  This is a real problem for poor people who do not have birth certificates.  They might have an election card or various bills as proof of identification and address, but if a rationing officer tells them, "prove to me that you're not Bangladeshi," they really have no way of doing so.  

My interviewees also often mention national security issues when I ask them to speculate on why their applications for ration cards haven't come through, which to me seems like an indication that they perceive (rightly or not) that the government may be treating them like outsiders.  I'd like to craft interview questions that can better get at this issue, but the topic makes people uncomfortable, so for now, I'm leaving it out.

I got a chance to ask the rationing controller of Maharashtra about this issue, sort of.  Today I had a second meeting with him.  He is a very welcoming person... he told his PA (personal assistant) to allow me to have full access to his office, and he encouraged me to ask him anything at all.  So I asked about the citizenship requirement.  I thought the answer he gave was quite interesting.  He didn't really say anything directly at all... but the exchange we had seems to imply that while there is no legal citizenship requirement, given that ration cards are used as proofs of residence in practice, in practice it makes sense to restrict them to citizens.  But maybe I'm reading too much into his words... he did choose them very carefully:

Rameez:  Does someone have to be an Indian citizen for getting a ration card?  Like, I'm a U.S. citizen, if I come to live here, can I get one?

Mr. Kerure:  Basically, food security-- the right to food-- is different, and citizenship is different.

Rameez:  So someone from outside can get [a ration card]?

Mr. Kerure:  That is to say, right to food is not restricted to a person of any origin.  But if you think of citizenship, then you should be Indian.  Because after all, the ration card is not [supposed to be used as a] proof of residence, as I already told you.

Rameez:  But because it is being used as that...

Mr. Kerure:  Yes, used.

Rameez:  then citizenship ka requirement hai?  (Then the citizenship requirement is there?)

Mr. Kerure:  Yes.